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This piece was written by an academic in response to a practitioner's
request. The particular puzzle posed by the practitioner was why, in
dealing with close corporations, courts used concepts associated with
legal categories such as trusts, partnerships, and estates rather than
restricting themselves to the field of corporations. In broadest terms, the
answer was that noncorporate categories attempt to resolve the same
structural problems, although the terms in which the resolutions are
articulated represent distinct dialects of the same language, or, in the case
of an accountant dealing with a corporate problem, even a distinct
language.
Given these terms, what this piece can be said to illustrate are the
difficulties presented by the fact that corporate law is a field encompassing
two structurally distinct forms of a single entity, and is therefore faced
with the task of contradictory trends. In particular, the article· attempts
to demonstrate the necessary limitations on academic analysis of the
precedents that constitute the language of corporate law; limitations
inherent in the fact that such precedents respond to the pressures of
adherence to general rules of law applicable to all corporate entities while
simultaneously informed by the fact that the influence of personal, as
opposed to economic, relationships has a particular significance .in
connection with a group of corporations designated as "close."
Q: Since you're taking a course in Corporations at school this term, I
assume you have read Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype ofNew England, Inc. l
A: As a matter of fact, I did read that decision, and found it puzzling
in the extreme. But since we're not practicing in Massachusetts, I stopped
when I realized there was no mention of Lank v. Steiner/ the Delaware
decision we've discussed so often in connection with the legal problems of
small businesses.
* Professor of Law, Yale University.
I. 328 N.E.2d 5Q5 (Mass. 1975). See a/so Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353
N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1<176), a decision which when read with Donahue nicely shows that general
rules dealing with close corporations are only as general as the particular case.
2. 43 Del. Ch. 262,224 A.2d 242 (Del. 1966).
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Q: What makes Lank so crucial to an analysis of the Donahue result?
A: To begin with, the first paragraph of Donahue cites two Massa-
chusetts cases for the proposition that "all inferences to be drawn from the
facts [as found by the.trial court] are open on this appeal.,,3 In Lank,
however, we have an entire opinion4 devoted to analyzing precisely why an
appellate court is justified in reaching legal conclusions different from those
arrived at by the trial judge "who has heard the witnesses and has had an
opportunity to gauge their credibility and reliability."s
Q: But that opinion was a dissent.
A: Yes, but what it argued was that the majority had committed an
error of law; that what should have been held was that persons in whom
confidence or trust is reposed assume, as a result, the burden of proving
that their actions with regard to persons reposing such trust and confidence
meet the high standards associated with a fiduciary relation.6 And the
holding of the Donahue case seems to be that:
In [Massachusetts] cases ... we have imposed a duty of loyalty
more exacting than that duty owed bY'a director to his corpora-
tion . . . or by a majority stockholder to the minority in a public
corporation because of facts particular to the close corporation in the
cases. In the instant case, we extend this strict duty of loyalty to all
stockholders in close corporations. The circumstances which justified
findings of relationships of trust and confidence in these particular cases
exist universally in modified form in all close corporations . . . State-
ments in other [Massachusetts] cases ... which suggest that stock-
holders of a corporation do not stand in a relationship of trust and
confidence to one another will not be followed in the close corporation
context.7
Q: If that is the Donahue holding, it is more difficult than ever to
understand the relevance of Lank, since the Lank dissent cites a Delaware
decisions as establishing the proposition that "[c]onfidential and fiduciary
relations have the same meaning in law;,,9 and Donahue seems explicitly to
be confined to in ip.terpretation of Massachusetts precedents.
,
A: I don't think it's valid to compartmentalize decisions in corporate
3. 328 N.E.2d at 509.
4. 224 A.2d at 248-49 (dissenting opinion).
5. 328 N.E.2d at 509.
6. 224 A.2d at 249 n.5 (dissenting opinion).
7. 328 N.E.2d at 51 (footnote omitted).
8. Payton v. William C. Payton Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 321,7 A.2d 737 (1939).
9. 224 A.2d at 250 (dissenting opinion).
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law quite that rigidly. You yourself have explained to me that legal
academics during the 1950's generally seemed to believe that most corpo-
rate law problems would be significantly mitigated if special provisions
were made for close corporations. Yet what has happened is that those
problems have been shifted in focus rather than mitigated, because the
same problems are now having to be faced in deciding whether or not a
given business can take advantage of the special procedures permissible for
close corporations. Indeed, even the Donahue opinion itself, after stating
that "[W]e limit the applicability of our holding to 'close corporations' as
hereinafter defined"IO points out: "There is no single generally accepted
definition."ll
Q: It may well be true that one of the prices we pay for living in a
federal society is a lack of"generally accepted" definitions of legal entities,
but I fail to see why that should prevent the Donahue holding from creating
"generally accepted" fiduciary standards for close corporations in Massa-
chusetts.
A: First of all, the decision cited 12 for the description of the duty being
applied was aNew York precedent, Meinhard v. Salmon. l3 Second, the
Donahue court was explicit in defining the duty being made applicable to
stockholders in the close corporation as "substantially the same fiduciary
duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another,,;14
and finally, as is made clear, in, for example, Justice Douglas' dissent in
Blau v. Lehman l5 (concerned as it was with the interpretation of § 16(b»,
Meinhard v. Salmon has by now become sufficiently "generally.accepted"
that it cannot plausibly be limited to "the operation of the [close corpora-
tion]."
Q: Even agreeing that the confusion between partnerships and corpo-
rations and the refusal to recognize the impact of Meinhard v. Salmon on
the operation of public as opposed to close corporations present theoretical
difficulties, I still don't understand why Donahue is "puzzling in the
extreme" if it is read simply as applying the Meinhard v. Salmon standard
of fiduciary duty to the operation of the close corporation.
A: If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that, whatever the
10. 328 N.E.2d at 511.
II. [d.
12. [d. at 516.
13. 249 N.Y. 458,164 N.E. 545 (Ct. App.1928).
14. 328 N.E.2d at 515 (footnote omitted).
15. 368 U.S. 403,416-17 (I962)(dissenting opinion).
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theoretical difficulties involved in defining the dose corporation, no such
difficulties are presented· if we read Donahue as standing for the legal
proposition that the Meinhard v. Salmon holding that "[j]oint adventures,
like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the
duty of the finest loyalty" applies also to the stockholders of close
corporations. If that were a "generally accepted" proposition of law,
however, it would render Lank v. Steiner meaningless. What that case
involved was the question whether one of two sons-in-law - both of whom
were involved in the active management of a business - could validly
exercise a stock option based on book value for the one-third of the stock
held by the father-in-law and his wife. The legal question presented was
whether or not the son-in-law should bear the burden of overcoming the
presumption of invalidity that attaches to any transaction providing
benefits to one of the parties in a fiduciary relationship. The issue in Lank
v. Steiner, therefore, was whether a fiduciary relationship existed between
the parents and son-in-law. Yet, on your reading of Donahue - since the
business involved in Lank v. Steiner was clearly a close corporation - the
fiduciary relationship in fact existed between the two sons-in-law.
Q: I'm pleased to see that they teach you to read cases closely at
school, but I fear you haven't read Donahue as closely as you should. The
court carefully points out, in footnote 18:
We stress that the strict fiduciary duty which we apply to stockholders
in a close corporation in this opinion governs only their actions relative to
the operation of the enterprise and the effects of that operation on the
rights and investments of other stockholders. We express no opinion as
to the standard of duty applicable to transactions in the shares of the close
corporation when the corporation is not a party to the transaction. 16
A: I'm afraid that is insufficient to distinguish Lank from Donahue.
The trial judge in Lank found that the father-in-law was fully aware of the
difference between the market and book value of the stock (which repres-
ented the benefit conferred on the son-in-law by the stock option) on the
basis that the father-in-law, "along with all the stockholders, signed a
resolution at a stockholders meeting . . . authorizing the sale of corpo-
rate assets [at market value]."17 As a result, the transaction at issue in
Lank did i~volve "actions relative to the operation of the enterprise."
Q: Are Lank and Donahue in fact distinguishable?
16. 328 N.E.2d at 515.
17. 224 A.2d at 244.
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A: I think so, if we focus on the fact that what Lank involved was a
dispute among siblings. In Donahue, on the other hand, the court
explicitly notes that:
In testing the stock purchase from Harry Rodd against the applicable
strict fiduciary standard, we treat the Rodd family as a single controlling
group. We reject the defendants' contention that the Rodd family cannot
be treated as a unit for this purpose. From the evidence, it is clear that the
Rodd family was a close-knit one with strong community of interest. 18
Q: Why does that distinction make a difference?
A: In Lank, "Steiner acted with his wife throughout in helping the
Lanks and in making frequent visits to them. They visited the Lanks more
than any of the other children.',19 As a result, the dissent concluded that
"The most reasonable inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts and
testimony are, in my judgment, that a relation of trust and confidence
existed between the Steiners and the Lanks such as to enable the Steiners to
exert infiuence over the Lanks; and that the Lanks relied upon the Steiners
as to the stock options.,,2o
In Donahue, on the other hand, "Harry Rodd had hired his sons to
work in the family business, Rodd Electrotype. As he aged, he transferred
portions of his stock holdings to his children. Charles Rodd and Frederick
Rodd were given positions of responsibility in the business as he withdrew
from active management. In these circumstances, it is realistic to assume
that appreciation, gratitude, and filial devotion would prevent the younger
Rodds from opposing a plan which would provide funds for their father's
retirement.,:21
Q: If that is a valid distinction, why doesn't Donahue stand for the
proposition that the stock purchases at issue there constituted a violation
of the fiduciary duties owed to a minority shareholder by a united family
unit in control of the corporation?
A: I think the facts that made it impossible for that proposition to be
the law of this case all occurred before 1955, and are given in the court's
opmlOn.
In the years preceding 1955, the parent company . . . made available
to Harry Rodd and Joseph Donahue shares of.. . common
18. 328 N.E.2d at 519.
19. 224 A.2d at 246 (dissenting opinion).
20. [d. at 249.
21. 328 N.E.2d at 520 (footnote omitted).
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stock . . . Harry Rodd took advantage of the opportunities offered to
him and acquired 200 shares ... Joseph Donahue, at the suggestion of
Harry Rodd, who hoped to interest Donahue in the business, eventually
obtained 50 shares. . . .
In June of 1955, [the corporation] purchased all ... of its shares
owned by its parent company [and the third stockholder] ... A sub-
stantial portion of [the corporation's] cash expenditures were loaned to
the company by Harry Rodd, who mortgaged his house to obtain some of
the necessary funds.
The stock purchases left Harry Rodd in control of [the corporation].
Joseph Donahue, at this time, was the only minority stockholder.22
Q: That's quite a Corporations course you're taking at school
Maybe when you're finished, you'll be able not only to read cases, but ever
to define a corporation; but will you be able to practice law with me?
22. Id. at 509.
